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ABSTRACT
Policy-making in democratic systems involves the consultation of
affected interests as well as relevant expertise. Yet, who provides
decision-makers with input and how this has changed over time is
a matter of contention. Whereas society-centred accounts point to
the involvement of interest groups in policy formulation,
epistemic accounts emphasise the participation of academic
experts in the analysis and design of policy. Yet, there are few
systematic empirical analyses of the developments over time in
the participation of these two groups of actors in the policy
formulation process. The article attempts to fill this gap by
examining participation patterns in Norwegian temporary advisory
commissions. Analysing a newly compiled database covering
more than 1500 commissions from the period 1972–2016, the
article finds a marked rise in the participation of academics over





Policy-making in democratic systems involves the consultation of affected interests as well
as relevant expertise. Yet, who provides decision-makers with input and how this has
changed over time is a matter of contention. On the one hand, society-centred accounts
emphasise the input of groups representing various societal interests. In order for policies
to be legitimate and effective, government needs the knowledge and political support of
relevant stakeholders (Peters & Barker, 1993; Thomas, 1995). The neo-corporatist system
of institutionalised interest group participation in policy formulation and implementation
is often seen as the apex of this phenomenon. Recent literature points to a new represen-
tativewave, with intensifying stakeholder consultation involving a broader range of societal
interests (see e.g. Arras & Braun, 2017; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Papadopoulos &Warin, 2007).
On the other hand, epistemic accounts highlight the contribution of academic knowledge
to the formulation of policy. Due to the complexity of modern society and expectations
about rational decision-making, policy-making has become increasingly reliant on scientific
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expertise (Kitcher, 2011; Turner, 2003; Weingart, 1999). Decision-makers need specialised
knowledge in order to understand cause-and-effect relationships, formulate effective pol-
icies and meet public demands for ‘knowledge-based’ political decisions.
The goal of the article is to assess these competing accounts empirically. While theoretical
diagnoses of developments in policy-making abound, systematic empirical analyses are rare.
Although some studies examine the participation of interest groups and academic experts in
policy advice in conjunction (e.g. Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2011), they only provide snapshots
and do not examine trends over time. In other words, there is a lack of longitudinal analyses
of these trends. Have academics crowdedout interest groups as providers of policy input, or is
it rather the other way around? The article attempts to fill this gap by examining changes in
participation patterns over time in bodies providing government with policy advice.
The Nordic countries offer a suitable context for examining these competing expectations
given their strong traditions for both corporatist interest representation (Blom-Hansen, 2000;
Christiansen et al., 2010) and technocratic policy-making (Heclo, 1974). The article concen-
trates on a type of body that has played a particularly important role in policy formulation in
the Nordic countries, namely ad hoc advisory commissions (Arter, 2008). More specifically, it
analyses changes in expert and interest representation within Norwegian temporary advi-
sory commissions known as Norwegian Official Commissions (Norges offentlige utredninger
– NOU). These commissions are appointed by government to examine a specific policy
problem and propose appropriate solutions, and can include civil servants, interest
groups, academics, politicians and other groups. The analysis is based on a newly compiled
database of Norwegian Official Commissions, which covers the period 1972–2016 and
includes more than 1500 commissions spread across all policy areas.
The article examines the following research question: How did the participation of interest
groups and academics in Norwegian advisory commissions change during the period 1972–
2016? To answer this question, the article traces the participation of interest group represen-
tatives and academics as commissionmembers over time. It examines changes in the overall
participation of these groups and also explores how these patterns vary across policy areas.
The analysis shows a marked rise in the participation of academics over time and a stable or
declining representation of interest groups. These findings provide empirical support for
arguments about the expertisation of policy-making. By contrast, they offer few indications
of a new upswing in stakeholder participation in the formulation of public policy. However,
more fine-grained analyses are necessary to draw any definitive conclusions.
The article proceeds as follows: The next section presents two competing accounts of
the changing participation in policy-making, which emphasise, respectively, the role of
societal interests and scientific experts. After a brief discussion of the Norwegian commis-
sion system, the data and methods are described. The empirical section presents and dis-
cusses the changes in the participation of societal groups and academics in these
commissions over time. The article concludes with some considerations about the impli-
cations and limits of the analysis.
Theoretical discussion: competing accounts of participation in policy
formulation
Who provides political decision-makers with advice about policy? Existing accounts
provide competing answers. Based on different basic assumptions about policy-making,
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societal and epistemic perspectives point to different resources as crucial in policy formu-
lation, different sources of legitimacy, and different actors as central in the provision of
information and advice (see Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2011). In the following, we explore
how these perspectives can explain and account for the involvement of different actors
across time as well as across policy areas.
Society-centred accounts
A first theoretical perspective emphasises the involvement of societal interests in the for-
mulation of public policy. Involving strongly concerned stakeholders and the most rel-
evant target groups in policy-making increases the likelihood that decisions are
democratic, effective and legitimate (see Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Papadopoulos &
Warin, 2007). Consulting citizens and stakeholders with local or sectoral knowledge and
expertise can produce better decisions, and increases the chances that policies are realis-
tically grounded. It facilitates smooth and successful policy implementation, also when the
decision goes against the stakeholders, as having had a say in policy formulation can ease
stakeholders’ acceptance of a final policy outcome (Thomas, 1995). Moreover, taking into
account the views of affected parties help governments to appear more open, democratic
and legitimate. If governments are willing to allow groups in society to put forward their
ideas for serious consideration, then policy-making is likely to be seen as properly demo-
cratic and legitimate, rather than imposed along preconceived lines (Peters & Barker, 1993,
p. 1). The relationship between government and stakeholders is often conceptualised as
an exchange relationship, where interest groups are given access to the policy-making
process in exchange for policy-relevant information and political support for the
passage and implementation of policy (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2015; Bouwen, 2002).
Many countries have long traditions for stakeholder involvement in policy planning and
formulation. The neo-corporatist literature from the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the insti-
tutionalised participation of interest groups in the formulation and implementation of
policy (Bouwen, 2002; Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982). Organised interests were routinely
and extensively consulted in the preparation of policy, and interest groups were rep-
resented on a wide range of advisory boards, commissions and councils. Boards and com-
missions were sites for bargaining and compromising between different interest groups
over policy, with the government as mediator. Participation was heavily skewed in
favour of core economic interest groups, such as the main trade unions and employers’
associations. However, later literature pointed to the decline of corporatism and a shift
towards a more open and pluralist system. This implied a scaling back of traditional struc-
tures and an increase in other forms of interest groups consultation (such as lobbyism)
(Christiansen et al., 2010; Rommetvedt, 2017; Rommetvedt, Thesen, Christiansen, &
Nørgaard, 2012).
More recently, scholars have pointed to a renewed increase in the access of societal sta-
keholders to policy-making. This ‘representative shift’ is considered part of what has been
portrayed as a broader shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’: from a vertical and hier-
archical to more horizontal and cooperative forms of ‘steering’, where the government
sustains coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors such as corporate
interests and civil society (Pierre, 2000, pp. 3–4). Complementing traditional parliamentary
and administrative policy-making, new participatory mechanisms have been proliferating
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in the last decades, examples being public dialogue meetings, population surveys, citizen
juries, public remises and other kinds of forums for public mediation and impact assess-
ment (Dryzek, 2000, p. 164; Weale, 2001, pp. 416–217). Another expression of an increased
consultation practice is that stakeholders gain access to policy-making arenas that were
previously off bounds. For instance, the European Union has developed an extensive
system of consultation with relevant stakeholders, including European Commission
expert groups that comprise interest groups (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2011; Metz, 2015)
and EU agencies’ involvement of stakeholders through public consultations, stakeholder
bodies and representation on management boards (Arras & Braun, 2017). Furthermore,
there has been a shift from the participation of groups representing economic interests
towards the involvement of a broader range of civil society groups representing
different values and causes (e.g. Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2015). Societal and political
changes have spurred mobilisation of citizens and stakeholders on issues such as environ-
mental change, immigration, health and elderly care. As a result, new interest groups,
NGOs and civil society organisations have appeared on the political scene and gained
access to policy formulation arenas (Binderkrantz, 2008; Fisker, 2013).
All in all, empirical scholarship within a society-centred perspective leaves us with
certain expectations about the trends in participation over time. First, we would expect
interest group participation in policy advisory bodies to decline from the 1970s/80s
onwards. Second, recent arguments about stakeholder participation may lead us to
expect interest group participation to grow again in the most recent period. Finally, we
anticipate some variations across policy fields. One would expect to see a variegated
pattern of change in interest group participation, with the presence of interest groups
declining in economic fields (e.g. economic policy, industrial policy, agriculture), while
increasing in other areas (e.g. environment and health and elderly care).
Epistemic accounts
By contrast, epistemic perspectives highlight the role of academic knowledge in the for-
mulation of public policy.1 Decision-makers rely on input from academic experts for
several reasons. For one, politicians need specialised knowledge to understand cause-
and-effect relationships and deal with the complexity and uncertainty related to public
policies (Haas, 1992). Given that the government administration seldom has sufficient or
sufficiently specialised knowledge, they have to reach out to academics and other
researchers for technical information and advice (Majone, 1996). For another, seeking
advice from scientific experts is a way to bolster credibility and legitimacy, by signalling
that policy-making is based on neutral, objective knowledge. As the concepts of intelligent
choice and rationality are cornerstones in modern policy-making, a government that fails
to receive, process and act on as sound knowledge as possible can appear as a poor and
illegitimate one (Feldman & March, 1981). Finally, governments might seek the advice of
academics for political-strategical reasons. Expert knowledge can serve as political ammu-
nition for advocating pre-determined policy preferences or to postpone or bury a decision
on a topic (Boswell, 2008, 2009; Schrefler, 2010; Weiss, 1979).
While academic knowledge has always played a role in policy-making, a number of
scholars argue that policy-making in recent decades has become increasingly reliant on
scientific knowledge – a phenomenon referred to as the ‘scientification’ (Weingart,
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1999) or ‘expertisation’ (Turner, 2003) of politics. Today, a growing number of issues are
simply so technical that advanced knowledge is indispensable for the formulation of
policy. Think for instance about the regulation of pesticides or the design of pension
systems. The increasing technological and regulatory complexity and level of specialis-
ation in modern societies even leads scholars to argue that expertise dependency consti-
tutes a ‘basic fact’ of modern societies (Holst & Molander, 2017). To be sure, some scholars
argue that ‘expertise’ is not limited to academic knowledge; it also involves other types of
knowledge and skills, such as the more applied knowledge of administrators or lay exper-
tise, as well as hybrid forms of expertise (see Grundmann, 2017 for a review). However, the
main theoretical and empirical focus of this article is on academic knowledge.
Modern-day policy-making, then, draws on academic experts and expertise to an
unprecedented extent and in manifold ways. An important expression of this trend is
the increasing power and autonomy of expert bodies like courts, regulatory agencies,
central banks and international financial institutions (Majone, 1996; Marcussen, 2006;
Vibert, 2007). Another is the rise and influence of expert professions within governments
and international organisations, such as the ascent of economists to powerful bureaucratic
and political positions in recent decades (Babb, 2004; Christensen, 2017; Chwieroth, 2009;
Fourcade, 2006). Scholars also point to a growing need to back up political arguments with
knowledge and research (Weingart, 1999). Moreover, the idea that public policies need to
be based on the best available knowledge and evidence in order to be effective gained
ground in recent decades, as exemplified by the campaign for ‘evidence-based policy-
making’ (Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007). To be sure, there are also tendencies that run
counter to this trend. The distrust and outright rejection of facts and expertise in the
Trump administration in the U.S. and in the Brexit campaign in the U.K. can be seen as
a powerful reaction to the expanding role of experts (Nichols, 2017).
Nevertheless, the bulk of theoretical arguments points to an increasing role for aca-
demic experts in policy formulation. We therefore expect the participation of academic
experts in policy advisory bodies to increase over the period from the 1970s until the
2010s. As for patterns across policy areas, there are reasons to expect that policy issues
often regarded as ‘technical’ (e.g. economy, trade and environmental issues) are more
prone to expertisation due to the functional demand for specialised economic knowledge
and a growing need to display economic knowledge in order for policy-making to be
perceived as legitimate (Fourcade, 2006; Markoff & Montecinos, 1993). Before these
broad expectations are investigated, we describe the empirical context and the research
design.
Nordic decision-making systems and ad hoc commissions
The Nordic countries offer a suitable context for examining these competing expectations
given their strong traditions for both interest representation and technocracy. The Nordic
decision-making systems have traditionally been seen as neo-corporatist in character, with
interest groups participating extensively and regularly in the preparation and implemen-
tation of policy (Blom-Hansen, 2000; Christiansen et al., 2010). At the same time, policy-
making in the Nordic countries has frequently been characterised as technocratic, with
a strong emphasis on finding rational solutions to policy problems based on relevant
knowledge and thorough investigation (Arter, 2008; Heclo, 1974). This duality makes it
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an appropriate setting for comparing developments in interest group and expert involve-
ment in policy-making.
Governments seek outside policy input through various types of advisory and consul-
tation bodies. Scholars have paid increasing attention to how the specific configuration of
advisory institutions varies across countries, giving rise to typologies of ‘policy advisory
systems’ (Craft & Howlett, 2013) or ‘knowledge regimes’ (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014). A
particular feature of the Nordic knowledge regimes is the emphasis on temporary advisory
commissions as a channel for advice (Anton, 1969; Christensen, Mouritzen, & Nørgaard,
2009; Christensen, Gornitzka, & Holst, 2017; Petersson, 2015). Ad hoc commissions have
been seen as a vital part of the decision-making process on major policy issues, and
more broadly, as a key element of the ‘Nordic model of government’ (Arter, 2008).
Given the important role of temporary advisory commissions in the decision-making
process in the Nordic countries, we focus our analysis on this institution. More specifically,
we examine ad hoc advisory commissions in Norway, which are known as Norwegian
Official Commissions. These commissions are appointed by Cabinet or a ministry to inves-
tigate a specific policy issue and propose solutions. The work of the commission is defined
by the terms of reference provided by the ministry. A commission usually works for a year
or more, synthesising existing knowledge and in some cases also carrying out or commis-
sioning new research. The recommendations of the commission are presented in a report
that is submitted to the relevant ministry and made publicly available. This advice usually
feeds into the early stages of the decision-making process, that is, before concrete policies
are proposed by the government. On average, nearly 35 commissions were appointed
annually over the period 1972–2016, making the Norwegian commission system far
more extensive than for instance commissions systems in the Westminster countries
(see Craft & Halligan, 2017). Moreover, existing studies show that these commissions
can have a significant influence on policy. For instance, commissions played a decisive
role in the design of a series of major economic reforms from the 1980s onwards (Chris-
tensen, 2017; Lie & Venneslan, 2010).
In existing research, the Norwegian commission system has been analysed from both
corporatist and epistemic perspectives. On the one hand, commissions have been
described as ‘the foremost institutional expression’ of corporatism in the Scandinavian
countries and analysed as venues for the institutionalised involvement of interest
groups in policy-making (Christiansen et al., 2010, p. 29; Egeberg, 1981; Rommetvedt
et al., 2012). On the other hand, recent work has highlighted the epistemic aspects of
these commissions, arguing that the commissions can be seen as deliberative bodies
through which expert arguments are brought into policy-making (Tellmann, 2016) or
pointing to the growing participation of academics in commissions in particular policy
fields like economic policy (Christensen, 2018; Christensen & Holst, 2017). However,
these two perspectives have so far not been examined in conjunction.
To be sure, there are limitations to what an analysis of Norwegian Official Commissions
can tell us. First of all, the findings cannot easily be generalised to decision-making systems
outside of the Nordic countries, given differences both in political-administrative insti-
tutions and the organisation of policy advice. Even within the Nordic countries trends
may vary across countries. Second, while ad hoc commissions occupy a central position
in the policy formulation process, especially on major policy issues, they do not provide
a full picture of the trends in the participation of interest groups and academic experts.
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The analysis does not capture developments within other channels, such as written con-
sultations or interest group lobbying towards political or administrative bodies. There may
well be developments in these parts of the system that run counter to the trends observed
in official commissions. Finally, examining participation on advisory commissions does not
allow us to draw conclusions about the actual policy impact of the groups participating on
these commissions. However, access is an important precondition for influence, and it is
not far-fetched to expect that major shifts in access to the policy formulation process
will have implications for patterns of influence over policy.
Data and coding
Data
We trace changes in the commission system by investigating the member composition of
commission over time – from the 1970s and up until today – and across different policy
areas. The analysis is based on a dataset comprising all ad hoc commissions that delivered
a policy report throughout the period 1972–2016. All NOUs are publicly available and can
be accessed from the webpages of the Norwegian government and the National Library of
Norway.2 Based on the information reports provide, we have constructed a dataset com-
prising all commissions and their members.3 The dataset includes information about the
affiliation of members, as well as characteristics of the report itself. The total numbers of
reports and members coded are displayed in Table 1.4
Norwegian advisory commissions can be divided into two main categories: policy-pre-
paring commissions and law-drafting commissions (lovutvalg). Whereas the first type of
commissions examine and provide recommendations about policy questions, the
primary task of the law-drafting commissions is to draft legal texts. The different tasks
of the two types of commissions and the fact that government recognises law-drafting
commissions as a distinct type of commissions makes it appropriate to keep these two cat-
egories apart. Given our interest in the formulation of overarching policy objectives and
solutions, we look exclusively at policy-preparing commissions in the analysis.5
Furthermore, some commissions produced several reports. In the analysis, however, the
unit of analysis is reports, and commissions that produced multiple reports are therefore
counted multiple times.
Operationalisation
Our main interest concerns how the member composition of commissions has changed
over time, both overall and in different policy fields. We operationalise members as
Table 1. Number of NOU commissions and members, 1972–2016.
1972–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2016 Total
All NOUs
Reports 452 406 294 251 127 1530
Members 3512 3315 2676 2663 1424 13590
Policy-preparing NOUsa
Reports 364 316 206 158 81 1125
Members 2907 2635 1872 1619 922 9954
aLaw-drafting commissions excluded.
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persons appointed to the commission initially, as well as persons who were appointed to
the commission at a later point in time and did not replace an existing member. As for
composition, we base our analysis on the affiliation that is listed in the report. Members
are classified as affiliated with one of the following eight groups:6
(1) Academics: Members in academic positions at universities and research institutes.
(2) Interest groups: Members representing interest groups such as labour unions, business
associations, professional associations and other non-governmental organisations.
(3) Civil and public servants: Civil servants employed in ministries and agencies, as well as
public servants such as doctors, teachers and police officers. The group also includes
employees of state enterprises, public prosecutors and military personnel.
(4) Private sector: People employed by firms operating in the private sector, consultancy
firms, etc.
(5) Liberal professions: Judges and lawyers in private practice.
(6) Politicians: Members of parliament, politicians at the regional and local level (deputy
representatives included), state secretaries, political advisors.
(7) Others, unspecified: e.g. foreign members, priests, members of other public commis-
sions, artists and authors, fishermen etc.
(8) Others, missing information: As we base our classification on the information provided
by the reports (which may provide insufficient information about the members) some
of our units appear as missing in the analyses below. We list the numbers of missing
members as a separate category.
Another crucial element is in what policy field the commissions operate. We base our cat-
egorisation of policy-fields on the ministry appointing the commission. Over the period
1972–2016, ministries have been established, terminated, reorganised and renamed a
number of times. To allow for comparison over time, we have assigned the various min-
istries that have existed in this period to 16 core ministries (e.g. Education; Health and
Social Services; Justice). The detailed classification is available upon request.
Results
Is policy formulation in Norway marked by a ‘representative wave’ or by a development
towards ‘expertisation’? In the following, we analyse these questions by presenting the
overall participation for interest groups and academics on advisory commissions over
time, before examining the same patterns by policy areas. First, we start by showing
the absolute number of participants from different categories on commissions in five-
year intervals from 1972 until 2016 (Figure 1).
It is important to bear in mind that the number of policy-preparing commissions
dropped markedly over time: from a yearly average of 45 in the 1970s to 12 reports on
average in 2012–2016. The number of members fell accordingly. Nevertheless, the
figure shows some rather clear trends in the absolute participation of interest groups
and academics on commissions. As for the interest group representatives, their presence
dropped noticeably over the period: they occupy less than half as many seats on commis-
sions in the 2010s (98 seats) as in the 1970s (236). There is furthermore no evidence of a
recent upswing or ‘representative wave’, as interest groups hit their low in terms of seats in
90 J. CHRISTENSEN AND S. HESSTVEDT
the two most recent time periods. By contrast, the absolute number of academics on com-
missions increased gradually over time. The participation of academics even overtook that
of interest groups in the most recent decade, which constitutes a remarkable develop-
ment. Most importantly, this upward trend is visible despite the drop in the total
number of commissions, which testifies to their relatively high increase in access to
policy formulation.
In Figure 2, we turn from absolute to relative numbers, and show the number of interest
group representatives and academics as a share of the total number of members.
Overall, the number of interest group representatives has remained rather stable
throughout the period. Relative to other categories, the presence of interest groups
increased somewhat from the beginning of the period until 1997–2001, but dropped
again in the last 15 years, to 16 percent in the most recent period. These developments
do not conform to the theoretical expectations about interest group participation, as
we do neither detect a fall after the ‘golden age’ of corporatism in the 1970s and 1980s,
nor a new wave of stakeholder representation in the recent decades.
The picture looks rather different for the relative presence of academics on commis-
sions. The figure shows that the share of academics increased dramatically over time,
from 7 percent in the 1970s to 26 percent in the latest decade. Academics even consti-
tuted the largest group of commission members in the period 2007–2011, surpassing
civil servants. The growth is nearly linear, with the share of academics increasing in
every five-year period apart from the most recent one.
The figure also shows that while civil servants traditionally made up the by far largest
group of commission members, their share decreased markedly the last 15 years: from
Figure 1. Number of researchers/academics and interest group representatives on commissions. 1972–
2016.
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between 40 and 50 percent in the 1970s–1990s to around 30 percent in the 2000s and
2010s. Moreover, the number of private sector participants has remained low over the
entire period, and other categories such as politicians and liberal professions (mostly
lawyers in private practice) also account for a modest share of members.
What do the participation patterns look like when broken down by policy area? Table 2
shows the share of commission members from different categories within different policy
fields, for the entire period 1972–2016.
The table reveals that the share of interest group representatives varied considerably
between policy areas. Interest group representatives make up the largest share in com-
missions reporting to the Ministry of Labour (42.3 percent), the Ministry of Industry and
Trade (23.7 percent) and the Ministry of Fisheries (23.5 percent). By contrast, the inter-
est group share is smallest in commissions reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office (0
percent) and the Ministries of Defence (7.8 percent), Education (7.9 percent) and
Justice (9.5 percent).
Turning to the participation of academics, their share of seats was greatest in commis-
sions appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29.3 percent) and the Prime Minister’s
Office (24.3 percent), but both ministries appoint a relatively limited number of commis-
sions. Of the ministries that appointed a large number of commissions, the share of aca-
demics was highest in commissions reporting to the ministries of Education (18.2 percent),
Justice (17.1 percent) and Finance (16.9 percent). Academic presence was less pronounced
in commissions appointed by the ministries of Transportation (3.9 percent), Defence (4.8
percent) and Petroleum and Energy (7.5 percent).
Figure 2. Affiliation of commission members 1972–2016. Percent of total number of members.
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In Figures 3–5 below, we add a time dimension to these observations. The figures show
the changes over time in the participation of interest groups and academics on commis-
sions by policy field, as measured by the share of total commission members. In order to
have enough data for each time period, we here look at the numbers per decade (rather
than in five-year intervals). To be able to draw conclusions, we only show results for policy
areas that have a certain amount of commissions/members and that are comparable
across time. We examine the changes in participation patterns for three policy areas:
Finance, Education, and Health and Social Services. In each of these three areas, there










Finance 44.5 16.9 18.8 3.6 3.2 4.0 5.0 4.0 100 1045
Justice 38.8 17.1 9.5 2.4 13.0 1.1 11.1 7.0 100 369
Foreign Affairs 26.8 29.3 11.4 7.3 2.4 4.9 12.2 5.7 100 123
Transportation 51.2 3.9 14.5 6.2 2.6 5.4 5.9 10.4 100 387
Petroleum and
Energy
49.1 7.5 13.7 4.2 2.8 0.9 5.2 16.5 100 212
Agriculture 28.4 11.4 16.4 1.9 6.5 0.6 21.0 13.9 100 324
Environment 50.5 15.1 9.9 1.7 1.2 3.8 6.2 11.7 100 598
Defence 51.1 4.8 7.8 0.4 1.1 14.1 8.5 12.3 100 270
Education 32.7 18.2 7.9 1.1 1.0 2.6 15.7 20.8 100 1424
Prime Minister’s
Office
39.6 24.2 0.0 0.0 4.4 2.2 8.8 20.9 100 91
Industry and Trade 36.2 7.9 23.7 10.0 1.5 2.4 9.0 9.2 100 619
Fisheries 42.7 10.2 23.5 0.8 1.6 0.0 12.2 9.0 100 255
Health and Social
Services
54.0 14.6 16.5 0.5 1.0 2.3 4.3 6.8 100 1463
Administration 38.0 14.8 21.7 1.4 3.1 1.3 7.4 11.1 100 1050
Local Government 39.2 8.8 19.1 1.4 2.9 13.3 5.5 9.6 100 1053
Labour 35.7 9.6 42.3 1.6 0.8 0.3 2.7 6.9 100 622
App. by parliament
etc.
57.1 2.0 14.3 0.0 4.1 18.4 4.1 0.0 100 49
Total (N) 4162 1326 1724 232 247 391 806 1066 9954
Figure 3. Finance: Affiliation of commission members 1972–2016. Percent of total number of members.
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were more than 100 commission reports in total, more than 100 commission members per
decade, and the area of responsibility of the ministries remained relatively stable over
time. For ease of interpretation, we only show the shares of the three main categories
of participants: civil servants, interest groups and academics.
Across all policy areas, there was an increase in the participation of academics. The
trend is most evident for commissions reporting to Finance and Education, where the
share of academic members increased more than threefold over the period. In the most
recent period, academics even hold the largest share of seats on commissions. In
Health and Social Services, a similar trend was visible until 2000, but the share dropped
Figure 4. Education: Affiliation of commission members 1972–2016. Percent of total number of
members.
Figure 5. Health and social services: Affiliation of commission members 1972–2016. Percent of total
number of members.
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again to less than 20 percent in the most recent period. Nonetheless, the figures indicate
that the rising participation of academics in advisory commissions was a rather general
phenomenon, manifest across three major policy areas that differ in important respects.
The development in interest group participation was more variegated. In the fields of
Finance and Education, interest groups’ share of seats declined from the 1970s
onwards. The numbers were halved from the 1980s to the 1990s in the field of Finance,
and the same development occurred for educational commissions from the 1970s to
the 1980s. Adding to the somewhat complex picture, the share increases in 2000–2009,
before dropping slightly in the 2010s. These developments to some extent fit the expec-
tations from the interest group literature, namely that of a decline in interest group pres-
ence after the era of corporatism and a resurgence of stakeholder participation in the most
recent years. However, the drop in the most recent period is difficult to reconcile with such
an account. By contrast, in Health and Social Services, interest group participation actually
increased from 15 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in the 1990s and remained stable
thereafter. Here, no ‘corporatist decline’ is evident. In other words, the developments in
interest group participation make up a rather varied picture and only partially conform
to the theoretical expectations.
Discussion and conclusion
What do these results tell us about the changing participation of interest groups and aca-
demics in policy advisory bodies? Do we see an ‘expertisation’ of policy-making or greater
involvement of stakeholders?
First of all, the analysis provides strong evidence for an increased role for academic
experts in policy-making. The practice of consulting academic experts in Norwegian pol-
icymaking has grown at a steady pace over the last 40 years. The numbers speak for them-
selves: the share of academics has increased more than threefold, with academics
outnumbering actors affiliated with interest groups, the private sector and the political
sphere.
The expertisation trend is further substantiated by our policy areas analyses. Even if par-
ticipation patterns within Health and Social Services commissions constitute a partial
exception, the growth in the share of academics is visible across policy areas. What is strik-
ing is that these areas are very diverse, including commissions investigating issues ranging
from pension, tax and economic growth, to school reforms, vocational training and univer-
sities. This may be an indication that the expanding role of experts is not limited to policy
fields usually seen as ‘technical’.
Turning to interest group participation, the trend is less clear. In absolute terms, the par-
ticipation of interest group representatives dropped considerably over time. This lends
support to the notion of corporatist decline from the 1970s and 1980s onwards, and to
the argument that commissions less of an important arena for interest group involvement
now than it used to be (see e.g. Rommetvedt, 2017). Yet, in relative terms, there is no
uniform decline in the participation of interest groups from the 1970s onwards. Overall,
the share of commission members representing interest groups grew slightly from the
1970s to the late 1990s. This was also the trend in the area of Health and Social Services.
By contrast, the share of interest group representative in Finance and Education commis-
sions dropped over the same period.
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Are there signs of a new wave of stakeholder involvement in the most recent period?
There are few indications of this in our analysis. Overall, our relative and absolute numbers
show no signs of resurgence in interest group participation in the most recent decades. To
be sure, there were signs of an uptick in interest group participation in the policy areas of
Finance and Education after the 2000s. However, these observations do not provide any
strong evidence for a new representative wave in policy-making.
Finally, it is worth noting the trend in the commission participation of civil servants –
the third major category of members. While this article has focused on developments in
academic and interest group participation, it should not be forgotten that commissions
were heavily populated by civil servants. Civil servants made up almost half of all commis-
sion members at the beginning of the period. Yet, their share declined markedly over time.
Even if they remained the largest group of members overall, they were surpassed by aca-
demics in both Finance and Education commissions. While examining these dynamics is
beyond the scope of this article, the changing role of bureaucrats on commissions
surely warrants closer attention.
Summing up, our analyses of Norwegian advisory commissions lend support to the
claim that contemporary policy-making is characterised by greater reliance on scientific
knowledge. The Norwegian government invites academic experts to provide policy
input at a higher rate than before. This development may be driven by a need for special-
ised knowledge beyond the in-house capacities of the civil service or by a desire to
enhance the legitimacy of policies in the face of increasing public expectations about
knowledge-based policy-making. However, there is little evidence for a direct link
between the rise of experts and the decline in the participation of societal stakeholders,
that is, that experts have crowded out interest groups. Although the commission
system is not the corporatist arena it used to be in the heyday of corporatism, the incor-
poration of societal interests in policy-making persists. As such, it may be useful to think of
these as two distinct trends. On the one hand, the corporatist system of interest consul-
tation has been scaled back over the last four decades. On the other hand, the consultation
of academic experts through advisory commissions has gradually been expanded.
One limit of this analysis is that we have not examined the different types of interest
groups involved in advisory bodies. If we were to break down the interest category into
a more detailed classification, the picture might look different: it may well be that ‘tra-
ditional’ interest groups related to labour, economic and business interests gradually
have been replaced by groups mobilised around specific issues or causes, such as environ-
mental issues or elderly care. Furthermore, societal interests may be incorporated into
committees’ work by other means than merely participation, such as remiss procedures
(høring), public consultations, public web pages, reference groups, population surveys,
and other mechanisms for letting societal stakeholders voice their concerns and opinions.
Unpacking the types of interest groups participating and the forms of interest represen-
tation on commissions is a task for future research.
Another important limit is that we have only examined one of a range of channels and
mechanisms for policy advice. Our data on advisory commissions does not pick up other
forms of interest group participation in policy-making, such as parliamentary lobbying or
direct contacts with ministries and agencies. This also goes for the use of academic exper-
tise in policy-making, which may occur through other channels such as policy advice from
the permanent bureaucracy, government research bodies or commissioned research. As a
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result, the observed trends towards more expert participation and less interest represen-
tation on commissions do not necessarily imply that Norwegian policy-making in general
has become ‘expertised’. However, these trends arguably make up an important part of
the overall picture.
To what extent can our findings be extended beyond the Norwegian case? We believe
that the findings have relevance for understanding changes within Nordic decision-
making systems more broadly, given the similarities of these systems and the importance
of ad hoc commissions in all the three Scandinavian countries. That corporatism has
declined but far from disappeared from the Nordic countries is well documented in the
literature and consistent with our findings (Blom-Hansen, 2000; Christiansen et al.,
2010). As for the role of experts in policy advice, the picture is not as clear. Data from a
major study of commissions in Denmark shows a growing participation of academics
(Christensen et al., 2009). Yet, the study emphasises the political-strategic aspect of com-
missions and interprets this development mainly as an expression of strategic expert use.
In the Swedish commission system, the main trend over time is the growing share of com-
missions consisting of a single investigator, who is often a judge or civil servant (Petersson,
2015). The possibility to generalise our results beyond the Nordic context is limited, as pol-
itical institutions and policy advisory systems differ considerably from the Nordic setting.
However, it is interesting to observe that our finding of a greater reliance on scientific
expertise in policy advice resonates with developments in other polities and other parts
of the political system, such as the recourse to technocratic governments in Southern
Europe (Alexiadou, 2018) or the scientisation of central banking at the European level
(Marcussen, 2006).
To conclude, the main contribution of this article is that it provides quantitative empiri-
cal evidence on the long-term developments in the involvement of interest groups and
academics in policy formulation. Despite its obvious limits, the analysis is an explicit
attempt to submit overarching theoretical diagnoses of developments in policy-making
to systematic empirical investigation. We believe that further empirical work along
these lines is an important avenue for future research. This also involves moving from
the type of descriptive-analytical question addressed by this article about trends over
time to explanatory questions about the determinants of these trends.
Notes
1. We use ‘epistemic accounts’ to refer to positive arguments about the role of expert knowledge
in policy-making. This should not be confused with normative arguments that emphasise
whether policy-making produces good decisions or outcomes.
2. www.regjeringen.no/en/find-document/norwegian-official-reports ; www.nb.no/en
3. With some exceptions: 1) Reports not available online and reports written by a ministry, a
research institute, a consultancy firm or similar are excluded. This concerns a small number
of reports: only 19 reports in total. 2) Some NOU reports come with appendices and/or sum-
maries of findings that are published as a separate report in the series. In these cases, only the
main report is included in the dataset.
4. We would like to thank Ragnhild Grønning and Jorunn Skodje for their help with collection
and coding of data.
5. Data on the overall composition of all commissions, including law-drafting commissions, is
presented in appendix A1.
6. The groups are mutually exclusive. In case of doubt, the member appears as ‘missing’.
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Appendix
Table A1. Affiliation of members, including law-drafting commissions.
1972–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2016 N
Researchers 7 10 14 17 23 1739
Civil/public servants 43 44 46 33 32 5555
Interest groups 14 17 18 23 19 2454
Private sector 2 2 2 3 3 295
Liberal professions 4 5 6 7 7 750
Politicians 6 4 2 3 1 449
Other categories 9 8 6 6 8 1039
Missing info 9 7 5 5 4 874
Missing 6 3 1 2 3 434
% 100 100 100 100 100
N 3511 3315 2676 2663 1424 13589
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